The Urban-Rural Divide in Canadian Federal Elections, 1896–2019 (Preprint) by Armstrong, Dave et al.
Western University 
Scholarship@Western 
Western Urban and Local Governance Working Papers 
2021 





Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/urban 
 Part of the Canadian History Commons, Models and Methods Commons, Political History Commons, 
Public Affairs Commons, and the Urban Studies Commons 
The Urban-Rural Divide in Canadian Federal Elections, 
1896–2019 
David A. Armstrong II, Western University 
Jack Lucas, University of Calgary 
Zack Taylor, Western University 
Abstract: Using a new measure of urbanity for every federal electoral district in Canada from 
1896 to the present, this article describes the long-term development of the urban-rural in 
Canadian federal electoral politics. We focus on three questions: (1) when the urban-rural divide 
has existed in Canada, identifying three main periods – the 1920s, the 1960s, and 1993–present – 
in which the urban-rural cleavage has been especially important in federal elections (2) where the 
urban-rural divide has existed, finding that in the postwar period the urban-rural cleavage is a 
pan-Canadian phenomenon; and (3) how well urbanity predicts district-level election outcomes. 
We argue that the urban-rural divide is important for understanding election outcomes during 
several periods of Canadian political development, and never more so than in recent decades. We 
conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for research on urban-rural cleavages, 
Canadian electoral politics, and Canadian political development. 
Acknowledgements: The authors are grateful to the following research assistants for their work 
on different aspects of this project: Moira Benedict, Tyler Girard, Christopher Hewitt, Amanda 
Miknev, and Kandys Paterson. 
Forthcoming in Canadian Journal of Political Science / Final Version / Aug. 2021
 0 
The Urban-Rural Divide in Canadian Federal Elections, 1896–2019 
 
1. Introduction 
No one was surprised on October 21, 2019, after the polls had closed in Canada’s 43rd 
federal election, at the news that Gudie Hutchings, incumbent Liberal MP in the district of Long 
Range Mountains, Newfoundland, had been safely re-elected to office. Western Newfoundland 
was a Liberal stronghold in the days of Joey Smallwood, and it remains a Liberal stronghold 
today. But one thing about Hutchings’ victory was unusual, something that made the re-elected 
MP stand out clearly from most of her Liberal colleagues: her riding was rural. Unlike in earlier 
decades, when many Liberals were elected in rural districts, the 2019 Liberal caucus was 
thoroughly urban, its members drawn by the dozen from Canada’s biggest cities. By land area, 
fully 84 per cent of ridings won by the Liberals in 2019 could fit comfortably within the borders 
of Hutchings’ Switzerland-sized constituency. Liberal support in western Newfoundland may 
have changed little over the decades, but the Liberal Party to which it remained so loyal had been 
profoundly transformed.  
This urban-rural divide in recent Canadian elections is hardly unique. In the United 
States, electoral polarization between urban and rural areas is clearer than ever, so much so that 
Rodden (2019: 106) has described recent American elections as “battles between a party that 
represents the downtown core and inner suburbs…and a party that represents the sprawling 
exurbs and rural periphery of such cities.” In Britain, many have noted the divide between a 
firmly “remain” metropolitan London and the Brexit-friendly English countryside. Similar 
patterns are visible on election maps in countries as diverse as France, Switzerland, and Hungary 
– tiny urban concentrations of party support dotted across the landscape, marooned in a vast 
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ocean of rural political opposition (Rodrígues-Pose, 2018). In many advanced democracies, 
electoral division between urban and rural areas is among the most striking features of 
contemporary politics.  
In Canada, despite evidence of a clear divide in recent elections, the urban-rural cleavage 
has been sorely neglected by political scientists. In part, this is simply because Canadian 
scholars’ attention has been elsewhere, focused on the religious, linguistic, and regional 
cleavages that animate so much of Canadian political development. It may also originate in a 
lack of consistent data with which to observe the evolution of the urban-rural divide over time. 
Whatever the cause, we currently know almost nothing about the historical development, 
political-geographic dynamics, or predictive power of the urban-rural cleavage in the long-term 
history of Canadian electoral politics.  
In this article, we initiate a new research agenda on the development of the urban-rural 
cleavage in Canadian federal elections. Using a new measure of the urban or rural character of 
every federal electoral district in Canadian history, we focus on three aspects key to any analysis 
of durable electoral cleavages. First, we explain when the urban-rural electoral cleavage has 
existed in Canada, identifying three periods in which it is especially pronounced: the 1920s, the 
1960s, and 2004–present. We argue that a durable urban-rural cleavage among the major parties 
emerged in the early 1960s, re-invigorated in 1993, and deepened after the Conservative Party’s 
consolidation in 2003. Second, we outline where this divide has been present in Canada. Despite 
some regional variation, we show that the postwar urban-rural cleavage is pan-Canadian in 
scope. Finally, we assess the importance of the urban or rural character of districts for 
understanding the elections that take place within them. This analysis clarifies the periods in 
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which urbanity predicts district-level election outcomes. We find that the urban-rural cleavage 
has been more important in recent elections than at any point in Canada’s history.  
Our results lay the groundwork for future research on the causes and consequences of the 
urban-rural cleavage in Canadian elections. However, this article also introduces several 
important new findings in its own right. We provide new evidence that the political upheavals of 
the Diefenbaker era produced a durable urban-rural cleavage between the major political parties 
for the first time in Canadian history. This shift must be understood, we argue, as a crucial 
element of the federal party system transformation that occurred during the 1950s and 1960s. We 
also show that it is the Liberal Party, not the New Democratic Party, that enjoys a consistent 
urban advantage in federal elections; indeed, it is the Liberal Party that benefits most from an 
increasingly urban Parliament in an increasingly urban Canada. This Liberal urban advantage 
may help explain why a party whose national support has gradually declined has nevertheless 
managed to remain dominant in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. We conclude 
by discussing how future research can build on our findings to explore urban representation in 
federal political institutions and policy, understand the relationship between the urban-rural 
electoral cleavage and public opinion, and explain how the political controversies and party 
strategies of the 1950s and 1960s forged a durable urban-rural cleavage whose size and 
importance has grown steadily larger over the past six decades.  
2. The Urban-Rural Divide in Canadian Elections 
Electoral divides between urban and rural districts have been a subject of growing 
attention among political scientists in recent years. This is especially true in the United States, 
where electoral geography manifests in a stark pattern: oceans of rural Republican red 
punctuated by urban islands of Democratic blue. In an extended treatment of this divide’s 
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historical development, Rodden (2019) traces the roots of urban Democratic support to the early 
manufacturing era and New Deal, while also pointing to the party’s more recent strength among 
urban knowledge workers. Similarly, Ogorzalek (2018) explores the New Deal–era emergence of 
an urban-rural cleavage in American voting behaviour and congressional coalitions, and its 
consequences for postwar federal politics and policy. Several excellent studies employ diverse 
methodological approaches to explain how urban and rural contexts affect political attitudes, 
behaviour, and social identities in the contemporary United States (Cramer, 2016; Gimpel et al., 
2020). Explicitly or implicitly, these recent studies trace a lineage to foundational research in 
comparative politics and political sociology that recognized the urban-rural distinction as a 
formative national political cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Weber, 1958).  
In Canada, despite a rich research tradition on agrarian political movements (e.g., Lipset, 
1950), attention to long-term urban-rural divides has been limited. In general, existing research 
falls into two main genres. The first comprises studies of specific elections or time periods, 
which mention urban-rural cleavages as part of a larger narrative of an election outcome. These 
“passing mentions” were common in the 1960s, a period in which, as we will see below, the 
urban-rural cleavage re-emerged as an important feature of Canadian electoral politics. Many 
observers in the 1960s noticed this divide, though their interpretation of its sources and 
significance varied considerably (Alford, 1964; Irvine, 1964; Meisel, 1962; Regenstreif, 1965). 
Political scientists’ attention to urban-rural cleavages faded in Canada through the 1970s and 
1980s, as public and scholarly attention turned to regional and linguistic cleavages. By the 
1990s, however, interest had re-emerged, especially in the work of Richard Johnston, who 
consistently emphasized the role of the urban-rural cleavage – particularly agrarian revolt – in 
Canadian political development (Johnston et al., 1992; Johnston, 2017). Flanagan’s (2007, 2009) 
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accounts of the origin and legacies of the Reform, Canadian Alliance, and Conservative Parties 
also emphasize the importance of urban-rural division in Canadian politics. While important and 
valuable, these treatments are exceptions to the general pattern. Most Canadian political science 
research, even if it acknowledges urban-rural variation in party support, pays little attention to 
the evolution, size, or importance of this variation for more general understanding of Canadian 
elections and political development. Even if this minimal attention proves to have been 
appropriate – that is, even if the urban-rural cleavage is not very important in Canada relative to 
other countries – this choice can only be adjudicated with systematic empirical evidence. As we 
will see, the relative absence of attention to urban-rural electoral divisions in Canadian elections 
becomes increasingly difficult to defend as we move through the postwar era up to the present.  
The second genre investigates variation in policy attitudes and political representation in 
urban and rural areas. For example, McGrane, Berdahl, and Bell (2017) explore variation in 
policy preferences among urban, suburban, and rural Canadians, as do Cutler and Jenkins (2000: 
385), who argue that the urban-rural cleavage in political attitudes “does exist but it is neither as 
wide or as deep as is often suggested”. Sayers (2013) investigates the role of urban-rural 
differences in cabinet selection, arguing that “city ministers” are common in recent cabinets even 
when controlling for other relevant differences between urban and rural MPs. And in a series of 
articles that is perhaps closest in spirit to the questions we pursue here, Walks (2004a, 2004b) 
examines spatial divides in political attitudes and representation, focusing primarily on the 
distinction between the core and postwar suburban zones of large metropolitan areas. 
All of these studies offer valuable treatments of urban-rural polarization in specific 
contexts, and we make use of this work when interpreting our own findings below. Missing, 
however, are two essential ingredients for any systematic study of the urban-rural divide. First, 
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attention to the measurement challenges involved in analyzing urban-rural cleavages – how to 
measure a district’s “urbanity” in a way that enables long-term comparative research – has been 
almost totally absent in Canadian research. As we will see, this absence is partly excused by the 
underdevelopment of methodological concerns in other countries. Second, and relatedly, we 
currently know little about the long-term history of urban-rural electoral division in Canada. Past 
work has offered clues as to where and when we might look, for example, periods of agrarian 
political mobilization, but we currently lack clear answers to the questions that animate this 
article: when and where has the urban-rural cleavage been present in Canadian politics, and how 
important is it for understanding district-level outcomes in Canadian federal elections. 
We will undertake more detailed analysis of specific periods in Canadian political 
development in the future. In this article, however, we focus on the big picture: urban-rural 
variation in support for major national political parties. While we discuss several minor parties, 
we acknowledge that they receive limited treatment here. Urban-rural divides in support for these 
smaller parties in specific time periods – urban labour parties, prairie progressives, the Green 
Party, and so on – deserve serious attention, and our data and measures are well suited to, and lay 
the groundwork for, these more specific analyses. 
3. Measuring the Urban-Rural Divide 
Some political scientists have included urban/rural indicators in models of Canadian 
federal election outcomes and voting behaviour. Unfortunately, however, the theoretical and 
methodological issues involved in measuring the “urbanity” of an electoral district have been 
seriously neglected. To understand our own measurement approach, we begin by surveying the 
three major strategies that political scientists have employed to measure an electoral district’s 
urban or rural character. 
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A first approach, which we call “threshold” measures, defines a population threshold 
above which a community is considered “urban.” Some American studies define urban 
communities as those with populations above 500,000 (Gamm and Kousser, 2013; Sauerzopf and 
Swanstrom, 1999). While effective as a rough proxy for urbanity in short-run analyses, fixed 
thresholds are inappropriate for longer-term research because the threshold of meaningful 
urbanization has changed dramatically over time; in Canada, a threshold of 50,000 would 
exclude all but the very largest cities in the 19th century, but would include places whose 
“urbanity” is questionable today. 
A valuable improvement is to define a dynamic threshold that increases as a country 
grows. For example, Lieberman (2009) and Ogorzalek (2018) define American cities as places 
with at least 0.1% (one-thousandth) of the national population at each decennial census. This 
produces a rolling list of American cities with good face validity, allowing them to investigate 
urban-rural politics over the long term in a manner that is sensitive to evolving baseline levels of 
urbanization. 
A second, “metropolitan” family of approaches defines urban and rural districts in 
relation to metropolitan areas as defined by statistics agencies. These distinguish urban cores, 
suburbs, and more distant rural areas on the basis of commuting patterns (USDA, 2020). Several 
American studies use this metropolitan approach (Scala and Johnson, 2017; Wolman and 
Marckini, 1998), and recent Canadian analyses of urban-rural and urban-suburban divides also 
depend on a metropolitan conceptualization (Cutler and Jenkins, 2000; McGrane, Berdahl, and 
Bell, 2017; Walks, 2004a, 2004b). While this approach may be useful for cross-sectional 
research, it breaks down over longer time periods because the methods used by statistics 
agencies to define metropolitan areas have changed over time, as has the scale of labour and 
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housing markets in relation to changing housing and transportation costs and the economic base. 
Changes to municipal boundaries through amalgamations and annexations also complicate 
making distinctions between core, suburban, and rural zones on the basis of territorial 
jurisdiction.  
A third family of approaches might be called “indicator” measures. Here researchers 
choose a particular indicator of a district’s urban or rural character, the most common of which is 
population density. This approach has yielded strong work in the United States, both historical 
(Rodden, 2019) and contemporary (Gimpel et al., 2020). In Canada, it is employed effectively in 
Sayers’ (2013) study of cabinet selection, which includes multiple indicators of district urbanity. 
Once again, however, the choice of indicators is rarely explicitly theorized, and many studies 
rely on data and indicators that are unavailable over longer spans of time. 
Each of these approaches has yielded useful findings on urban-rural electoral divisions. 
At present, however, district urbanity measures suffer from three important weaknesses. First, 
measures of district urbanity remain undertheorized. With very few exceptions (Ogorzalek, 
2018; Sayers, 2013; Nemerever and Rogers, 2021), researchers spend little time explaining why a 
measurement strategy is preferable or how a measure may reliably capture the urban or rural 
character of districts. Second, with the exception of the dynamic threshold, researchers have not 
developed measures that enable systematic analysis over long timespans, during which the scale 
and socio-economic and physical character of urbanization has changed considerably. These 
weaknesses prevent conventional metropolitan and indicator approaches from being employed in 
long-term research. Finally, as is common in political science more generally, every study of 
which we are aware has assumed that a district’s urban or rural character can be measured 
without error. In other political science subfields, such as democratization, methodologists have 
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demonstrated that this false precision can have serious consequences for inference (Treier and 
Jackman, 2008). There is every reason to believe that this is equally true of the urban-rural 
divide. 
4. A New Long-Term Measure of District Urbanity 
Given these weaknesses, we believe that political scientists have much to gain from 
adopting a measure of district urbanity that is theoretically grounded, enables long-term analysis, 
and explicitly acknowledges the uncertainty involved in measuring complex social phenomena. 
We therefore have three priorities for our own measure of district urbanity in Canada. The first is 
to build a measure that recognizes the latent quality of a district’s urban or rural character. As 
urbanity is a multidimensional construct, a measure of district urbanity that incorporates multiple 
indicators is likely to generate a more theoretically satisfying and empirically valid summary of 
electoral districts.  
Our second priority is to enable long-term analysis, which requires both theoretical and 
practical sensitivity. Theoretically, we must be aware that the meaning and importance of a 
particular measure as an indicator of urbanity might change over time. The most obvious 
example is population size, whose meaning will evolve as a country’s population grows. Another 
is the economic base; earlier in history, urbanity may be strongly associated with manufacturing 
employment, while today services may be more important. More practically, we must be 
sensitive to the availability of consistent data across a long timespan. The earlier the era 
considered, the less likely that demographic and other data will have been consistently collected. 
In our study, this required not only careful selection of indicator variables, but also major new 
data collection efforts. 
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Finally, we believe that the study of the urban-rural cleavage requires explicit 
acknowledgement that its measurement necessarily involves uncertainty. As we will explain 
below, our measurement model allows us not only to better understand the uncertainty in our 
measure, but also to propagate this uncertainty through subsequent analyses, producing more 
robust findings. Following important work in other domains, including democratization (Treier 
and Jackman, 2008) and political ideology (Hare et al., 2015), we conceptualize urbanity as a 
latent variable and employ Bayesian estimation to measure it with uncertainty.  
4.1 Indicators of District Urbanity in Canada 
The precise definition of an “urban” place is a subject of ongoing – and probably 
irreconcilable – discussion and debate. Nevertheless, many researchers implicitly or explicitly 
draw from foundational work in sociology, economics, geography, and urban history in 
emphasizing five central features of “urban” places: size, institutionalization, density, economic 
activity, and social heterogeneity (see Deuskar, 2015). In our measure, we begin by linking the 
size and institutionalization of urban settlements to produce a dynamic threshold indicator of 
urbanity. While the population size of a federal electoral district is not itself a useful measure of 
its urbanity, the proportion of its population living within large incorporated municipalities is. As 
the meaning of “large” varies over time, we follow Lieberman and Ogorzalek by adopting a 
dynamic threshold approach. A “large” municipality is defined as containing at least 0.1% of the 
national population at each census. Using paper and digital census volumes, we first compiled a 
list of every incorporated municipality whose population surpasses this threshold in each 
decennial census between 1871 to 2011. We then used paper and digital census records to record 
the proportion of each district’s population residing within these large municipalities.  
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Our dynamic threshold indicator implicitly recognizes a second important feature of 
Canadian urban development: institutionalization. As demands for urban services multiply as 
rural crossroads expand into more substantial settlements, increasingly sophisticated local 
government institutions are established to meet them. A key indicator of this process is 
municipal incorporation, which brings with it democratic representative institutions, local 
taxation, and the fiscal and administrative capacity to provide services and infrastructure 
(Bloomfield, Bloomfield, and McCaskell, 1983; Wallis, 1994). Our dynamic threshold indicator 
thus includes only incorporated municipalities. The resulting indicator, which we have calculated 
for all districts from 1867 to the present, ranges from 0 (no one in the district resides in a large 
incorporated municipality) to 1 (everyone in the district resides in one).  
Our third characteristic is density. Cities are defined by the concentration of human 
activity and the intensity of the built environment. We capture these aspects as population 
density and the proportion of the housing stock composed of apartments. To measure a district’s 
density, we require both the district population (the numerator) and its land area (the 
denominator). Both of these values are readily available in digital form beginning with the 1987 
representation order (RO). For earlier years, we transcribed district population counts from 
printed census volumes from the first national census in 1871 to 1986. To calculate consistent 
district land areas, we created a spatial dataset of district boundaries spanning the 13 ROs from 
1892 to 2013.1 We then calculated each district’s land area (excluding water features) and 
population density. To capture the intensity of the built environment, we also extracted housing 
	
1 Digital shapefiles are available for the 1987–2013 ROs. For the 1892–1976 ROs, we created digital boundary 
files from digital maps generously provided by cartographer J.P. Kirby and validated them against paper atlases and 
sheet maps. Prior to 1892, maps are not available, and must be reconstructed entirely from statutory descriptions 
(see Winearls, 1972). We are at work on this time-intensive task. 
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stock information from the census – apartments as a proportion of total dwellings – which is 
available for all but one decennial census since 1961. 
Our fourth characteristic of urbanity is economic activity. Urbanization as a historical 
process is related to industrialization (Scott 1986). Urban places are therefore distinguished by 
their industrial and occupational profile, as it is in cities that value is added to natural resources 
through manufacturing and wealth is generated through producer services, while rural 
hinterlands are defined by primary-sector economic activities: farming, fishing and trapping, 
forestry, and other forms of natural resource extraction (ILO, 2018; Strange, 2016). While rural 
labour has historically been directed toward primary resource extraction – farming, fishing and 
trapping, mining, and forestry – urbanites toil in the secondary and tertiary sectors of the 
economy. We operationalize this aspect of urbanity as the proportion of the labour force working 
in non-primary industry occupations.  
Our final characteristic is social heterogeneity. Sociologists have long viewed social 
heterogeneity as a defining feature of urban life, permitting encounter, conflict, and cooperation 
across groups (Wirth, 1938; Simmel, 1964). To capture this aspect of district urbanity, we 
prioritized census variables that have been measured consistently and comparably over time: 
religious denomination (1951–present) and visible minority status (1996–present).2 As society 
has become more secular – 4.3 per cent of Canadians reported as atheists in the 1971 census, 
compared to 23.8 per cent in 2011 – race has become a more salient marker of diversity as 
immigration has transformed the Canadian population, and particularly in large metropolitan 
	
2 We chose these over the census’s ethnic origin or country of birth variables for two reasons. First, the 
categories vary considerably from one census to the next, making cross-time comparability impossible. Second, the 
census has in some years enabled respondents to select more than one ethnic origin, which creates the 
methodological problem of how to handle a wide range of response combinations. 
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areas. According to the 2016 census, 41 districts are majority non-white, and 84 per cent of 
visible minority Canadians live in the 120 ridings that correspond to the greater Toronto, 
Montréal, and Vancouver metropolitan regions (Taylor, 2021). We calculate a fractionalization 
index for each, indicating the relative heterogeneity of the population. 
 
*** INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Historical census data come from several sources. Blake (1984) aggregated district-level 
socio-demographic data for selected elections between 1908 and 1968 and Statistics Canada has 
disseminated selected census data at the electoral district scale since 1991 (RO 1987). However, 
Blake’s datasets did not include all variables and documentation for all years required to 
construct our measure. To fill this gap, we assembled data from Statistics Canada’s basic 
summary tabulation series for enumeration areas, the smallest geographic unit for which census 
data were disseminated between 1961 and 1996, and aggregated these data to federal electoral 
districts.3 
The result of these data collection efforts, which we summarize in Table 1, is a 
comprehensive new dataset on each of the more than 4,000 federal electoral districts in Canada’s 
post-Confederation history. Drawing on diverse research traditions, these indicators capture 
multiple distinct but correlated dimensions of urbanization and urban life.4 While we will extend 
this dataset in future work, it is the most comprehensive aggregate data series on Canadian 
federal electoral districts ever constructed. 
	
3 See the supplementary material for detailed information on the specific sources by census year. 
4 See the supplementary material for the correlation among the indicators and their relationship with the latent 
variable for each RO. 
Table 1: Summary of Indicators 
Indicator Measure ROs Covered N 
Size and 
Institutionalization 
% of district population in incorporated 
municipalities meeting dynamic population threshold 
1867–present 4,057 
Density    
– Population density Population per square km (log) 1892–present 3,463 
– Built environment Apartments as % of housing stock 1952, 1976–present 1,789 
Economic activity Non-primary occupations as % of labour force 1947–present 2,285 
Social heterogeneity    
– Religious diversity Religious fractionalization index 1947–present 2,312 







4.2 Advantages of a Multiple-Indicator Measure of Urbanity 
 Our multiple-indicator approach to district urbanity, which conceptualizes the urbanity of 
an electoral district as a latent quality indicated by size, institutionalization, density, economic 
activity, and social heterogeneity, has both theoretical and empirical advantages over a single-
indicator approach. Theoretically, as we have noted above, we draw on diverse disciplinary 
traditions of conceptualizing urbanity. Rather than insist that a single tradition captures the “true” 
meaning of urbanity, we believe a measure that incorporates each of these traditions brings 
greater theoretical richness to political science research on the urban-rural cleavage.  
 Empirically, the multiple-indicator approach also has the advantage of higher validity and 
lower measurement error, allowing each indicator to compensate for other indicators’ 
weaknesses across space and time. A density-only measure, for instance, performs well for most 
urban districts, but falters when a district’s population is mostly urban but also includes a large, 
lightly populated surrounding rural area – a common feature of many Canadian districts, 
especially in the first half of the twentieth century. In these circumstances, our dynamic threshold 
indicator helps to compensate for measurement error in the density indicator by recognizing the 
unevenness of human settlement. Similarly, our dynamic threshold indicator may itself falter in 
cases when a municipality is relatively small but is nestled within a recognizably urban region – 
such as the municipality of Westmount on the Island of Montréal – but this circumstance causes 
no trouble for the density, diversity, or economic indicators.5 Each indicator thus helps to 
compensate for “edge cases” that would trouble a single-indicator approach.  
	
5 We are grateful to Andrew Sancton for suggesting Westmount as an example. 
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 As our indicators are related to one another, each capturing a distinct dimension of 
urbanity, our measure is not likely to generate markedly different results from those we might 
achieve from a single-indicator approach; indeed, in the online supplementary material, we show 
that the results of our main analysis below are substantively identical when using a density-only 
measure.6 That said, measurement exercises like the one we undertake here have intrinsic value.  
Not only do they generate a new variable but they also reveal theoretical complexity and nuance.  
Measuring urbanity this way allows us to draw from the empirical strengths of multiple empirical 
indicators, and acknowledge the uncertainty involved in measuring such a complex socio-spatial 
phenomenon. Even more, it allows us to provide rigorous, empirical corroboration for a long and 
theoretically rich, interdisciplinary body of scholarship.  
4.3 Measuring Urbanity 
We have argued that district urbanity is an unobserved latent variable whose presence is 
indicated by five core features: population size, institutionalization, density, economic base, and 
social heterogeneity. To measure this latent quantity, we employ the following Bayesian factor 
analysis model:7  
𝑦!"# = 𝛽"#𝜉!# + 𝜖!"# 
 
Here, 𝑖 refers to each electoral district for each of the 𝑘 indicators in each of the 𝑡 representation 
orders, and 𝜉 is a latent measure of each district’s urban or rural character. Additionally, for all 
indicators with the exception of the dynamic threshold, we allow the effect of 𝛽" to vary by 
representation order according to a random walk process - 𝛽"# ∼ 𝑁(𝛽"#$%, 10). We set 𝛽%# = 	1 
	
6 In our robustness test using a density-only model, we also provide additional evidence to support our latent 
measurement approach over a simpler density-only measure of district urbanity. 
7 We exclude districts prior to RO 1892 because we have just one indicator, the dynamic threshold, for this 
period.  
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for the dynamic population threshold variable for all representation orders, ensuring that higher 
values of the latent variable indicate higher levels of urbanity. To fix the centre of the latent 
distribution, we set the electoral district with median values on all indicator variables to zero. We 
provide more information on the model, including detail on implementation and convergence, in 
the online supplementary material.    
 
*** INSERT TABLE 2 HERE *** 
 
Our measurement model allows us to construct an urbanity measure that satisfies the 
criteria outlined above: it is built on a theoretically defensible, multiple-indicator 
conceptualization of urbanity; it enables systematic long-term comparison; and it produces a 
measure which includes not only a point estimate for each district, but also a distribution of 
plausible urbanity scores. The uncertainty in our urbanity measure depends, appropriately, on the 
availability of the indicator variables; thus, uncertainty is higher in the earlier period, when fewer 
indicators are available.  
To provide a basic validity check on the results of our measurement model, Table 2 
describes characteristic electoral districts at five points in the urbanity distribution. The 
minimum end of the distribution contains extremely large and sparsely populated northern 
districts, such as Churchill River, a district that in 2003 encompassed the entire northern portion 
of the Manitoba. At the 25th percentile, districts remain mostly rural, but typically contain one or 
more small towns within their boundaries, such as the Ontario cottage country district of Parry 
Sound–Muskoka in 1952. Some settlements may fall below the dynamic population threshold or 
be unincorporated. At the median, we find geographically large districts containing larger towns 
Table 2: Representative Sample of Districts, by Urbanity Percentile 
Percentile Examples 
Minimum • Yukon, 1924: Entirety of Yukon Territory 
• Churchill River, 2003: Entire northern portion of Manitoba, from Lake Winnipeg to 
the northern border 
25th Percentile • Parry Sound–Muskoka, 1952: Large district in Ontario “cottage country” 
containing several small towns 
• Avalon, 2013: Most of Newfoundland’s Avalon Peninsula, excluding St. John’s but 
including Town of Carbonear 
Median • Drummond, 1966: Central Québec district containing Drummondville 
• Niagara West, 2013: Ontario district containing small towns such as Grimsby and 
Pelham and a small portion of St. Catharines 
75th Percentile • Victoria, 1933: Medium-sized city of Victoria, BC 
• Calgary North, 1976: Northern portion of city of Calgary 
Maximum • Cartier, 1933: Compact district in the core of Montréal 




(such as Drummondville in 1966) or small portions of cities (such as Niagara West in 2003). At 
the 75th percentile, districts have become recognizably urban, encompassing medium-sized cities 
such as Victoria, British Columbia or the outlying portions of larger cities like Calgary, Alberta. 
Finally, at the upper end of the distribution, we find compact districts in the cores of Canada’s 
largest cities. Overall, this continuum from large rural districts through to compact urban districts 
suggests that our measure successfully captures differences in district urbanity over time and 
across geographic space. We provide additional detail on the urbanity measure, including overall 
distributions for each Representation Order, in the online supplementary material.    
4.4 Assessing the Urban-Rural Divide 
Having constructed our measure of district urbanity for each federal electoral district in 
Canada, the final step was to join the urbanity measure with federal election results. We use a 
publicly available database of federal elections containing district-level results for every federal 
election in Canadian history.8 Manually adding our unique federal electoral district identifier 
codes to the election results dataset enabled us to merge our district urbanity measure with 
district-level election results.9  
To assess the relationship between party vote share and district urbanity, we fit separate 
linear models for each major party and election, regressing district-level vote share on district 
urbanity; these models include region fixed effects to account for differing overall levels of 
	
8 The database is currently available from Semra Sevi, who added a hand-coded ID for federal candidates to an 
election results dataset previously distributed by the Government of Canada. See Sevi, Arel-Bundock, and Blais 
(2019). We updated the dataset to include the 2019 election results. 
9 An important byproduct of our dataset construction process is the creation of a uniform system of 
identification codes for federal electoral districts. These enable the linkage of election results data to census data, 
and of both to boundary shapefiles, enabling spatial analysis and mapping. More detail is available in the online 
supplementary material. 
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urbanization across Canadian regions. We use Monte Carlo integration to propagate uncertainty 
in our district urbanity measure through these regression estimates, allowing for more robust  
estimates of the relationship between urbanity and electoral outcomes (Treier and Jackman, 
2008). 10  
To assess the relative importance of the urban-rural cleavage across time, we fit two 
multinomial logistic regression models for each election, with the winning party in each district 
as our dependent variable: a “base” model containing regional dummies, and an “urbanity” 
model adding the district urbanity measure. We then compare the models to assess the 
improvement in model fit provided by district urbanity. In these models, we account for 
uncertainty in the urbanity variable by fitting each of the multinomial logit models for 1,000 
distinct draws from the posterior distribution of our measurement model. This allows us to assess 
the improvement in model fit across 1,000 plausible urbanity values for each district at each 
election.  
5. Results 
5.1 When Do We See the Urban-Rural Divide in Canada? 
Figure 1 summarizes the relationship between district urbanity and party vote share for 
six major political parties from the 1896 election (the first held under the 1892 RO) to 2019. 
Each point in the figure represents a single election; points above the dotted horizontal line 
indicate a positive relationship between district urbanity and vote share (“urban advantage”) and 
points below the dotted horizontal line indicate a negative relationship (“rural advantage”). 
Shaded areas represent 95% confidence regions. As noted above, these estimates are drawn from 
	
10 The regions are British Columbia, Prairies, Ontario, Quebec, and Atlantic Canada. We provide more detail on 
the Monte Carlo integration procedure in the supplementary material. 
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models that include region fixed effects to account for differing levels of urbanization in 
Canadian regions. The estimates thus capture an estimate of the expected within-region 
difference in vote share associated with variation in district urbanity. The results in Figure 2 can 
be interpreted as the expected change in a party’s vote share associated with a one-unit shift in 
district urbanity; this measure ranges from a minimum value of –1.5 to a maximum value of 
+1.5, and a one-unit shift can most easily be interpreted as the expected change in vote share 
associated with a shift from a median district to a 75th percentile district in Table 2.  
While there is much to absorb in Figure 1, we focus on a few general highlights. The 
earliest evidence for an urban-rural divide in support for the major parties emerges in the 
wartime election of 1917. It persists through the emergence and decline of the Progressive Party 
in the 1920s before disappearing. After this brief interwar divide, a null pattern persists until 
1962, when the Liberal Party develops an enduring and substantively large urban advantage over 
the Conservative Party. After a particularly dramatic surge in urban support in Pierre Trudeau’s 
first election as liberal Leader in 1968, the Liberal Party’s urban advantage has grown steadily 
from the early 1970s to the present. By 2019, a one-unit shift in a district’s urbanity score is 
associated with an increase of more than eight percentage points in Liberal Party vote share. This 
is an extraordinary gap between the Liberal Party’s expected performance in rural districts and 
its performance in cities. 
The Conservative Party’s trajectory after 1962 is somewhat more complex than that of 
the Liberals, with increases and decreases in rural advantage associated with changes in party 
leadership and more general patterns of Conservative boom and bust. The Progressive 
Conservative Party enjoyed a clear rural advantage in the late Diefenbaker years, which faded 
during the Stanfield and Clark leadership periods. The rural advantage then returned in the 
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1980s, reflecting Brian Mulroney’s success in Québec’s nationalist rural ridings. The rural 
advantage disappeared again during the PC Party’s lean years in the 1990s, as the new Reform 
Party, Canadian Alliance, and Bloc Québécois stole a substantial portion of its rural base. When 
the Canadian Alliance and Progressive Conservative parties merged before the 2004 election, the 
rural advantage reappeared in dramatic fashion, and has remained very large ever since. Notice 
also that the trajectory of the Reform / Alliance party from 1988 to 2000 – which is included in 
the top plot in Figure 1 – provides the path that connects the Progressive Conservatives of the 
1980s to the Conservative Party of the new millennium. In its rural advantage, at least, the figure 
testifies to the truth of Flanagan’s (2009: x) remark that “the Conservative Party is the legitimate 
heir of Reform.” 
The results in the bottom plot of Figure 1, which summarize the CCF/NDP trajectory, are 
equally interesting. For the party’s first quarter century, the wide shaded orange region, 
consistently overlapping the dotted zero line, tells a story of a party whose support was drawn 
from both urban working-class districts and more rural agrarian and resource hinterlands. The 
CCF’s struggle to break out of this pattern ultimately led to the New Democratic Party, which 
sought to project a new image of a more modern – and urban – labour party (Young 1969). At 
first, this strategy was successful, as the NDP picked up a substantial urban vote share advantage 
in the 1962 election, its first under the new moniker, and retained that advantage for more than a 
decade. By 1974, however, the party’s urban advantage disappeared, never to return.  
 
*** INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE *** 
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Figure 1: Urban/Rural Vote Share Advantages, By Party 
 
Caption: Relationship between district vote share and district urbanity for each party and 
election. Positive values indicate urban advantage; negative values indicate rural advantage. 
Each coefficient is drawn from a district party-year regression model. Shaded areas represent 































































































































































Figure 2: Urban/Rural Vote Share Advantages, by Party and Region 
 
Caption: Relationship between district vote share and district urbanity for each party and 
election in each region. Each coefficient is drawn from a district party-year-region regression 
model. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence regions.  
  

















































































































5.2 Where Do We See the Urban-Rural Divide in Canada? 
To explore the regional trajectories of the urban-rural divide in Canada, Figure 2 repeats 
the analysis in Figure 1, but does so within five Canadian regions. The large size of the 
confidence regions in some parts of the county and time periods means that we must proceed 
with caution when interpreting these sub-sample results. Nevertheless, the figure reveals several 
important and interesting patterns. First, and perhaps most importantly, the figure suggests that 
the Liberal Party’s increasing urban support from the early 1960s to the present is a pan-
Canadian phenomenon. The timing of the Liberal Party’s consolidation of an urban advantage 
varies by region – in Atlantic Canada, for instance, the Liberal Party actually enjoyed a rural 
advantage until quite recently – but the overall trajectory in each region is steadily upward. 
Outside Atlantic Canada, the Liberal Party has been favoured in urban districts for several 
decades. 
Once again, the story for the Conservative Party is more complex, volatile, and 
regionalized.11 The regional breakdown clarifies the source of the urban-rural divide that briefly 
emerged in the 1917 election: the effect is most dramatic in Québec, where Conservative support 
among Anglo-Montréalers was sufficient to secure the party’s only Québec riding. The 
Conservative Party’s rural surge in Ontario, the Prairie provinces, and Québec during the 
Diefenbaker years is also visible in the figure, as is Mulroney’s base of support in rural Québec 
in the 1980s. Despite localized volatility, the regional Conservative Party results display an 
overall downward tendency since the end of the Second World War, with an especially sharp 
drop in the early 2000s. 
	
11 Note that this analysis does not include the Reform/Canadian Alliance Party.  
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As for the NDP, our results suggest that the overall lack of an urban or rural advantage 
for the CCF/NDP in Figure 1 above is not a function of different bases of support in different 
regions; large shaded regions and coefficients close to the zero line are particularly noticeable in 
British Columbia, the Prairies, and Ontario. Only in Atlantic Canada does the NDP enjoy a clear 
urban advantage, owing to its strength as an urban labour party in cities such as St. John’s and 
Halifax. In Québec, the NDP’s urban advantage through much of the 20th century is a function 
of its more general weakness in that province; the party was surely happy to see this “advantage” 
disappear in 2011 with Jack Layton’s breakthrough in many rural Québec ridings. 
5.3 How Important is the Urban-Rural Divide? 
Thus far we have surveyed the long-term trajectories of urban and rural support for major 
parties. But how important is district urbanity for understanding which parties win or lose? 
Figure 3 provides a preliminary answer to this question, summarizing the improvement in model 
fit provided by the district urbanity variable when added to a model containing nothing but 
regional intercepts. We construct this figure by carrying out multinomial logistic regression 
models of the winning party in each district for each general election. Then, we calculate the 
expected Proportional Reduction in Error (ePRE) described by Herron (1999). Consider the two 
models: 𝑀& and 𝑀&'(, the regional dummy and regional dummy plus urbanity models, 
respectively. From these two models, we then calculate the predicted probability for each of the 𝑗 
categories of the dependent variable: 𝑝)
(&) and 𝑝)
(&'(). We can then calculate the probability that 
𝑦 takes on its observed value 𝑝[-!]
(&)  and 𝑝[-!]
(&'().12  We then calculate the ePRE as  
	
12 To be clear, 𝑝[#!]
(&)  and 𝑝[#!]













The y-axis values in the figure give the extent to which predicted probabilities that 𝑦	takes on its 
observed value increase as a function of adding urbanity to the model. The figure can be 
interpreted as follows: if the shaded region is entirely above the horizontal dotted line, we can be 
confident that we are looking at an election in which a district’s urbanity improves the predictive 
capacity of the model. Small values, like those indicated between the main periods of urban 
importance, indicate periods where the change in predicted probabilities is statistically different 
from zero, but substantively very small.   
 
*** INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE *** 
 
The results in Figure 3 add additional richness and context to our discussion above. The 
patterns in the figure suggest that, when we broaden our focus from major national parties to the 
larger array of parties elected to Canada’s Parliament, the urban-rural divide has been especially 
important for understanding election outcomes in three distinct periods. The first period, from 
1917 to 1926, covers the rise and fall of interwar agrarian political activism, with an additional 
surge in 1935 due to Social Credit’s popularity in rural Canada. This urban-rural divide is at its 
peak during the period of the Progressive Party’s success and its initial reabsorption into the 
Liberal Party in the early-to-mid-1920s. 
The second period, as we have discussed above, represents the second half of the 
Diefenbaker era, beginning in 1962, when both the Liberal Party and the NDP enjoyed an urban 
advantage and the Conservative Party performed especially well in rural districts. This second 
Figure 3: Improvement in Model Fit from Urban Variable, by Year 
 
Caption: Improvement in model fit in a model with district urbanity and region indicators when 
compared with a model containing region indicators alone. Gray shaded regions represent 95% 
probability regions.  
 
  





















































































period peaked quickly in 1963 and then declined gradually to the end of the 1970s – a decline 
that is generated by the disappearance of Social Credit, the diminishing urban advantage of the 
NDP, and the less rural character of Conservative support during the Robert Stanfield and Joe 
Clark years. 
The third period, which begins in 1993 and continues up to today, follows the opposite 
trajectory. The period begins with the Reform and Bloc Québécois breakthroughs in 1993, and 
then surges upward with the consolidation of the Conservative Party prior to the 2004 election, 
after which the significance of the urban-rural divide has dramatically increased. With the 
exception of 2011 (in which the importance of the urbanity variable is moderated by two factors, 
the New Democratic Party’s temporary sweep of rural Québec and Conservative success in 
Ontario’s suburban regions and smaller cities), the urban-rural divide has over the past 15 years 
been more valuable for understanding Canadian election outcomes than in any other period in 
Canadian history.13 
6. Discussion 
The urban-rural divide, long recognized by comparative scholars as one of the core 
cleavages of modern democratic politics, is playing an increasingly important role in Canadian 
federal elections. Using novel data on Canadian federal electoral districts from 1867 to the 
present, we have developed a new measure of district urbanity for each of Canada’s federal 
electoral districts, which we employ in this article to assess the long-term development of urban-
rural cleavages in Canadian federal election outcomes. In general, our analysis points to the rise 
and fall of urban-rural divides over three distinct periods: a wave of agrarian politics and urban 
	
13 Comparing expected PRE values, we find that values for both the 2015 and 2019 elections are higher than 
previous peaks (1921 and 1968) more than 99.9% of the time; our data thus strongly suggest that district urbanity is 
more important for district-level outcomes today than at any point since 1896.  
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labour activism in the immediate aftermath of the First World War; a period of substantial 
electoral reconfiguration in the second half of the Diefenbaker era; and, most recently, a sharp 
increase in the urban-rural divide following the consolidation of the Conservative Party in 2004. 
Several lessons – and many new questions – emerge from our results. For the moment, 
we wish to emphasize three particularly important findings for scholars of Canadian federal 
electoral politics. The first is the significance of the Diefenbaker era in general, and the elections 
of the early 1960s in particular, in setting a foundation for a postwar urban-rural cleavage that 
has persisted up to the present day. Political scientists in the early 1960s noticed the emerging 
urban-rural divide in the elections they were studying, and occasionally speculated on how 
durable that divide would be in future elections (Alford, 1964; Irvine, 1964; Meisel, 1962; 
Regenstreif, 1965). The answer, from a distance of nearly sixty years, is that the cleavage has 
proved to be very durable indeed: the Liberal Party has enjoyed a significant advantage in urban 
districts in every general election since 1962, and while Conservative rural support has been 
more variable, the urban-rural vote share divide between the two major parties has consistently 
been large and significant. Scholars of Canadian political development already recognize the 
importance of the Diefenbaker era in shaping the character of future Canadian federal elections 
(Johnston, 2017). The emergence of a durable urban-rural divide in this period must be 
recognized as a crucial dimension of this important reconfiguration. 
Why did the elections of the early 1960s prove to be so important for the emergence of a 
persistent urban-rural cleavage? We hope to provide a more detailed answer to this question in 
future research; however, a preliminary survey of existing scholarship suggests that both “push” 
and “pull” factors were involved. On one side, Prime Minister Diefenbaker’s identity as a small-
town Prairie lawyer, and his bitter criticism of business and media elites in Canada’s big cities, 
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may have pushed professionals and wealthy voters in urban areas away from their traditional 
loyalties (Regenstreif, 1965). At the same time, a profound transformation inside the Liberal 
Party, in which a set of highly educated urban professionals came to play a leading role both as 
strategists and political candidates, appears to have increased the Liberal Party’s appeal in the 
urban context (Meisel, 1964; Regenstreif, 1965). These sociological shifts, combined with more 
immediate concerns among middle-class and wealthy voters about the Diefenbaker government’s 
fiscal prudence, may help to explain the dramatic emergence of the urban-rural divide in the 
early 1960s. If correct, this explanation resembles arguments by Rodden (2019) regarding the 
urbanization of postwar support for the Democratic Party, which he links to rise of urban, well-
educated “knowledge workers” with fiscally conservative and socially progressive attitudes. 
A second important lesson we draw from our results in this article, which is closely 
related to the first, is that it is the Liberal Party that has consistently enjoyed an urban advantage 
in the post-war period. This seems to us a crucially important but overlooked aspect of the 
Liberal Party’s dominance of the federal electoral landscape in the 20th century. As Richard 
Johnston has astutely noted, each time the Liberal Party returned to power after a period of 
Conservative government, it returned weaker than it had been before (Johnston et al., 1992). 
Given this secular decline, how is it that the Liberal Party has continued to dominate federal 
electoral politics? The answer is undeniably complex, and involves the national question, party 
divisions on the ideological right, and other factors, but our findings suggest that the Liberal 
Party’s steady urban advantage after 1962 is an important ingredient in Liberal success.14 
	
14 To be sure, constitutional protections for small provinces, coupled with large permitted variance in federal 
electoral district populations, mean that urban areas have been underrepresented in the Canadian Parliament. This 
disadvantages parties with urban support, such as the Liberals. Our argument, however, is that the Liberals benefit 
from their status as an increasingly urban party in an increasingly urban legislature – even if the benefit is not as 
large as it would be in the absence of structural under-representation. 
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*** INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE *** 
 
To appreciate this point, consider the trend in Figure 4, which plots the distribution of 
district urbanity scores at each representation order from 1952 to present (the gray density 
regions) as well as the average urbanity of the Canadian Parliament (the vertical black lines). The 
steady rightward shift of the vertical black lines tells a story of an increasingly urban legislature, 
and the increasing density at the rightward end of the distributions, combined with the emptying 
out of the leftward portion of the distributions, illustrates the increasing weight of urban districts 
in Parliament’s overall composition. Enhanced urban representation is not simply the result of 
urbanization as a generalized national process. It is also produced by periodic parliamentary 
redistributions, which have allocated new seats almost entirely to growing urban areas, and large 
metropolitan centres in particular. It may be no accident that the urbanization of parliamentary 
representation appears to have increased since Canada adopted independent electoral boundary 
commissions in the late 1960s. While variation in the population size of districts has favoured 
rural districts and small provinces, a party with a strong and growing vote share advantage in 
urban districts is in a strong position to win elections. 
Our findings also shed light on the regional basis of the historical development of the 
New Democratic Party and its precursor. Today, the NDP is sometimes viewed as an urban party 
– the party of the latte and laptop crowd in city cores – that has lost touch with (rural) farmers 
and resource workers and (urban) organized labour that comprised its original coalition. Our 
analysis shows, however, that the NDP has not possessed a statistically significant advantage one 
way or the other nationally since the 1970s, and that this is true everywhere except Atlantic 
Figure 4: District Urbanity, 1952–2019 
 
Caption: Distribution of district urbanity at each representation order (RO) from 1952 to the 
























Canada, where the NDP has become a distinctly urban party. In light of Canada’s single member 
plurality electoral system, the New Democratic Party appears to face a double disadvantage: not 
only is its support relatively diffuse across Canadian regions, it is also relatively diffuse across 
urban and rural ridings within regions, with support as likely in remote resource communities as 
in the heart of major cities.  
Finally, and perhaps most obviously, our findings offer clear evidence that Canadians are 
currently experiencing the most profound urban-rural divide in support for the major political 
parties in the country’s history. In no prior era has district urbanity been more clearly associated 
with election outcomes, nor has it ever been more firmly entrenched in the competition between 
the country’s two historical governing parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives. The gap in 
party support between urban and rural districts is among the most important features of the 
contemporary Canadian political landscape. 
7. Conclusion 
Our purpose in this article has been to provide a descriptive foundation for a new 
research agenda on the role of urban-rural divides in the long-term development of Canadian 
federal electoral politics. By building a theoretically grounded measure of the urbanity of federal 
electoral districts spanning the entirety of post-Confederation history, we offer a novel historical 
portrait of the urban-rural divide in Canadian elections. We see substantial opportunity for future 
research to clarify and explain the findings outlined in this article. 
Above all, political scientists should extend our big-picture findings by undertaking more 
focused studies of specific periods of Canadian political development, to better understand how 
and why urban-rural cleavages emerge and recede in Canadian federal politics. In the 1960s, for 
instance, did the urban-rural divide first emerge in party caucuses, reflecting a “caucus-first” 
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process recently described in another context by Godbout (2020), or do we see it first emerge in 
public attitudes and preferences, to which political parties then responded? For example, each of 
the three spikes in urbanity’s importance to election outcomes correspond to periods of rapid 
urban growth and rising urban housing prices.15 In-depth quantitative and qualitative studies of 
the 1950–70 and 1990–2010 periods have the potential to enrich both our empirical and 
theoretical understanding of the development of political cleavages and political institutions in 
Canada. 
We must also investigate the representational consequences of the urban-rural divide in 
Canadian political institutions. For instance, our long-term measure of district urbanity enables 
an extension of Sayers’ (2013) “city ministers” hypothesis to the full sweep of Canadian federal 
politics, reinvigorating earlier investigations of geographical representation in cabinet (Bakvis 
1988). It will also allow us to assess the electoral consequences of widely differing levels of 
“voting strength” for urban and rural residents in Canada due to variation in district population, 
as well as how the adoption of non-partisan boundary commissions has shaped the representation 
of urban areas in Canada’s Parliament. 
Further, our analysis enables investigation of the policy effects of the urbanization of 
representation in national institutions. If the relative urbanity of party caucuses and cabinets is 
consequential to Canadian political life, it should be detectable in political discourse and policy 
agendas. Employing our district urbanity indicator in analyses of policy documents, party 
platforms, and parliamentary speech may unlock new understandings of the linkage between 
representation and governing agendas.  
	
15 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting the latter fact. 
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Finally, our analysis opens the door to investigation of other, interacting processes, such 
as the political salience of suburbanism. It is common in Canada and elsewhere to portray 
suburbanites as swing voters whose alliance with urban and rural blocs determines elections 
(Ibbitson, 2021). Walks (2013) usefully casts suburbanism as a way of life that is independent of 
the spaces with which it is often identified; that is, “suburban” lifestyles may be found in 
locations with both urban and rural objective characteristics. Further analysis would illuminate 
the political implications of the changing relationship between signifiers of suburbanity – home-
ownership and automobile dependency, for example – and the urban-rural continuum. 
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Supplementary Material
Indicators and Federal Electoral Districts: Additional Detail
As noted in the main text, our measurement model incorporates six indicators of urbanity. Here we provide
additional detail on our sources for each indicator.
• Dynamic threshold. For the 1871–1951 period, we retrieved population counts and incorporation status
for census subdivisions from aggregate tables digitized by the Canadian Century Research Infrastructure.
To compute the proportion of these municipalities’ populations in each electoral district, we used district
population breakdown tables in each decennial census volume. For later years we assembled data from
decennial census data products available through the University of Toronto’s Canadian Census Analyzer
facility and Map and Data Library.
• Population density: FED populations were manually from paper census records for 1871-1976. To
calculate each district’s land area, the contemporary inland and coastal water features as defined in
2016 Census cartographic hydrologic boundary files was subtracted from the federal electoral district
shapes, which contain generalized coastlines and omit lakes and rivers, after which the net land area
was calculated using ArcGIS software.
• Apartments as a proportion of total dwellings. This variable is available in census records from 1961
onward. However, while the census included a housing type variable in 1971, the raw source data file
required for our analysis could not be processed due to the absence of the required record layout file.
• Racial diversity. This variable is calculated from census data (see below for more detail) using the




i , where s represents each census racial group and i
is each electoral district.
• Religious diversity. This variable is calculated from the Blake dataset for the 1951 census and from
official census records for subsequent censuses (see below for more detail). We calculate religious
diversity as a religious fractionalization index in the same manner as racial diversity above.
More generally, our sources for census-based indicators are as follows: data on religion and occupation
for RO 1947 (Census 1951) are from Blake (1984). Data for religion, occupation, and housing stock
for RO 1952 (Census 1961), RO 1966 (Census 1971), RO 1976 (Census 1981) are aggregated from the
basic summary tabulation files available from the University of Toronto’s Map and Data Library (https:
//mdl.library.utoronto.ca/collections/numeric-data/census-canada). All subsequent data are downloaded
from the University of Toronto’s Canadian Census Analyzer facility: RO 1987 (Census 1991), RO 1996
(Census 1996), RO 2003 (2006), and RO 2013 (Census 2016).
As we discussed in the main text, we have also created a uniform system of identification codes for each
federal electoral district from 1867-2019. This ID code follows the logic of Statistics Canada’s federal electoral
district code, which is available starting in RO 1987 – a two digit province code, followed by a three-digit
district code – to which we appended the four-digit RO year as a prefix. We constructed similar codes for the
1867–1976 ROs. From RO 1933 to RO 1976, we adopted standard numbering systems for electoral districts
found in the redistribution statute or official atlases. In RO 1924 and earlier, we numbered districts based on
their alphabetical order. We also corrected the inconsistent coding of the territories in different ROs and
accounted for the creation of new provinces.
Table 1 and figure 1 provide quantitative and visual summaries of each of the indicator variables in the
district urbanity measurement model.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Indicator Variables, by Representation Order
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Indicator Variables
id N mean sd min max
Apartment Dwellers 1952 263 0.22 0.23 0.01 0.96
Apartment Dwellers 1976 282 0.23 0.19 0.01 0.88
Apartment Dwellers 1987 295 0.25 0.21 0.01 0.96
Apartment Dwellers 1996 302 0.25 0.20 0.02 0.95
Apartment Dwellers 2003 309 0.25 0.20 0.02 0.96
Apartment Dwellers 2013 338 0.26 0.21 0.02 0.97
Density 1892 207 602.78 2295.70 0.04 18343.37
Density 1903 228 703.18 2697.63 0.06 20245.23
Density 1914 230 989.93 3506.05 0.02 28865.48
Density 1924 241 1204.72 3962.18 0.01 34696.80
Density 1933 243 1356.72 3979.21 0.01 32608.70
Density 1947 260 1486.41 3960.42 0.01 28896.67
Density 1952 263 1478.96 3721.67 0.01 27173.35
Density 1966 264 1482.73 3201.40 0.01 22732.69
Density 1976 282 1254.99 2389.96 0.01 16336.32
Density 1987 295 1094.88 1875.80 0.01 10351.94
Density 1996 303 1138.21 1896.61 0.01 11371.77
Density 2003 309 1203.24 1906.08 0.01 10987.92
Density 2013 338 1389.31 2186.14 0.02 16941.81
Dynamic Threshold 1892 207 0.16 0.31 0.00 1.00
Dynamic Threshold 1903 228 0.18 0.32 0.00 1.00
Dynamic Threshold 1914 230 0.22 0.35 0.00 1.00
Dynamic Threshold 1924 241 0.26 0.38 0.00 1.00
Dynamic Threshold 1933 243 0.29 0.40 0.00 1.00
Dynamic Threshold 1947 260 0.32 0.40 0.00 1.00
Dynamic Threshold 1952 263 0.34 0.40 0.00 1.00
Dynamic Threshold 1966 264 0.44 0.42 0.00 1.00
Dynamic Threshold 1976 282 0.54 0.42 0.00 1.00
Dynamic Threshold 1987 295 0.54 0.43 0.00 1.00
Dynamic Threshold 1996 303 0.59 0.42 0.00 1.00
Dynamic Threshold 2003 309 0.63 0.40 0.00 1.00
Dynamic Threshold 2013 338 0.66 0.40 0.00 1.00
Non-Primary Occupation 1947 232 0.69 0.24 0.21 1.00
Non-Primary Occupation 1952 263 0.82 0.17 0.35 1.00
Non-Primary Occupation 1966 264 0.90 0.11 0.52 1.00
Non-Primary Occupation 1976 282 0.93 0.08 0.61 1.00
Non-Primary Occupation 1987 295 0.94 0.06 0.65 1.00
Non-Primary Occupation 1996 302 0.95 0.06 0.64 1.00
Non-Primary Occupation 2003 309 0.96 0.05 0.67 1.00
Non-Primary Occupation 2013 338 0.98 0.02 0.88 1.00
Racial Diversity 1996 302 0.16 0.19 0.00 0.78
Racial Diversity 2003 309 0.22 0.23 0.01 0.81
Racial Diversity 2013 338 0.30 0.25 0.01 0.83
Religious Diversity 1947 259 0.37 0.19 0.00 0.70
Religious Diversity 1952 263 0.36 0.18 0.00 0.68
Religious Diversity 1966 264 0.44 0.20 0.01 0.72
Religious Diversity 1976 282 0.44 0.20 0.03 0.73
Religious Diversity 1987 295 0.49 0.20 0.05 0.76
Religious Diversity 1996 302 0.53 0.19 0.06 0.76
Religious Diversity 2003 309 0.56 0.16 0.10 0.76
Religious Diversity 2013 338 0.57 0.15 0.11 0.76
3
Measurement Model and Analysis
We use a Bayesian factor analysis model to measure district urbanity. To improve model fit, we use the
log of racial diversity and apartment dwellings, and transform non-primary occupation using a Box-Cox






































































Figure 2: Correlations Among Urbanity Indicator Variables
We implement our model in JAGS, drawing 5,000 posterior samples from each of two chains following a
burn-in period of 10,000 iterations. Post-estimation quantities (such as r-hat values and effective number of
samples) provide good evidence of convergence.
Figure 3 summarizes the relationship between each indicator and the latent variable at each Representation
Order.
We use Monte Carlo integration to propagate uncertainty in the urbanity measure through our subsequent
party vote share analyses. We first select a random subset of 1,000 posterior draws from the measurement
model; each of these draws captures a vector of plausible district urbanity scores. We then regress party
vote share on district urbanity (with region fixed effects) 1,000 times, using a distinct vector of urbanity
values in each iteration. We take a random draw from the posterior distribution of βurbanity for each of
the 1,000 models; more specifically, we draw from the multivariate normal distribution of the model and
record our draw for βurbanity in each iteration. Summarizing the median and 95% probability bounds of
this distribution of 1,000 draws provides our estimate of the relationship between urbanity and party vote
share, incorporating uncertainty in the latent variable.
We repeat this procedure for each party in the analysis (Conservative, Liberal, CCF/NDP, and Re-
form/Alliance) at each election to produce the results summarized in Figure 1 in the main text. We
then repeat the procedure within each of the five regions to produce the results in Figure 2.
4


















































































Figure 3: Relationship Between Indicators and Urbanity Measure
5
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Urbanity Measure
ro N mean sd min max
1892 207 -0.49 0.67 -1.52 1.58
1903 223 -0.47 0.69 -1.46 1.55
1914 230 -0.38 0.74 -1.63 1.61
1924 241 -0.31 0.80 -1.71 1.61
1933 243 -0.23 0.83 -1.68 1.59
1947 259 -0.41 0.75 -1.67 1.32
1952 263 -0.28 0.82 -1.65 1.28
1966 264 -0.01 0.88 -1.36 1.37
1976 282 0.15 0.90 -1.36 1.46
1987 295 0.21 0.90 -1.31 1.51
1996 302 0.22 0.89 -1.66 1.53
2003 308 0.35 0.86 -1.51 1.54
2013 338 0.51 0.82 -1.23 1.66
Urbanity Measure: Summary Statistics
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Figure 4: Distribution of Latent Variable, by Representation Order
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Robustness: Density Indicator
To demonstrate that our results are not driven by the varying presence of particular indicators in the
measurement model, figure 5 summarizes our vote share models in the main text using population density
rather than our latent measure as the independent variable of interest. The results are substantively identical
to those reported in the main text.
While our overall results are substantively identical using the density indicator, we re-emphasize our argument
in the main text that there are several advantages to our latent urbanity approach. For example, when we
compare multinomial logit models using log density versus our latent measure, AIC comparisons strongly
favour the urban latent measure 9 times out of 36 and favour the log density model zero times out of 36.
A Clarke Test on the two models suggests that the latent urbanity model is statistically better than the
log density model for 15 of 36 general elections and the log density model is better in just 4 of 36 years.
Thus, while the overall trends look similar, we have good reason to believe that our latent measure leads to







































































































































































































































Figure 5: Party Vote Share Analysis with District Population Density
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